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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THREE D CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, DISTRIBUTORS 
INC, UTAH, a Utah corporation, 
LORIN S. MILLER, d/b/a 
WESTERN BATTERY MANUFACTURING, 
TED R. BROWN and WARREN B. 
BROWN, Trustee, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
This Reply will comment on the Brief of respondent, 
treating the various portions in the order in which they are 
presented in the Brief: 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
At page 1 respondent states three propositions as 
being the issues in this case. Plaintiffs answer question No. 1: 
Yes, where the building permit issued by the City gives designated 
parking spaces and the building is constructed in reliance on 
the building permit, business is developed to utilize the parking 
spaces and all of the spaces have been in constant use without 
interference until the events involved in this action. 
Question No. 2 is really two questions in one. Plaintiffs 
Case No. 87-0127 CA 
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do not deny that the City may alter the use of its streets to 
meet reasonable police power objectives by redesigning the street? 
but the second portion of the question is not admitted. Our 
position is that the City cannot eliminate space allocated for 
vehicle or pedestrian access to the owner's private property 
without paying compensation. 
The third question is ambiguous and also needs an 
explanation. It is necessary to distinguish between a physical 
taking of property and a taking of property rights which have 
been established and are recognized; and furthermore, our position 
is that reasonable access is not provided where all the access 
does is permit patrons to drive on to the property but denies 
the utilization of the property as to number of parking spaces, 
the nature of the business which can be carried on in the buildings 
adjacent to the parking spaces, and where the destruction of 
reasonable access to the parking spaces has caused severe damage 
to the value of the plaintiffs' properties. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Plaintiffs do not rely on § 78-12-13, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. Plaintiffs do not challenge the right and 
power of the City to establish a median strip, to construct 
a viaduct, to eliminate U-turns or left-hand turns, or to widen 
streets as a means of regulating the flow of traffic, but those 
are not the issues in this case. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In Paragraph 1 on page 3, plaintiffs take issue with 
the statement that plaintiffs and their customers reached the 
parking spaces "by driving over a sidewalk". It is true that 
the access to the parking spaces was from the street to an area 
in front of the plaintiffs1 buildings. There was neither a 
gutter nor a sidewalk in front of either building (R. 263, 326, 
371, 372, 381). 
The statement in Paragraph 2 is inaccurate and incomplete. 
Actually, the City acquiesced in the position of plaintiffs 
that they were entitled to compensation for loss of parking 
if a portion of plaintiffs1 property was to be physically appro-
priated (R. 270, 271, 273, 279, 283). It is true that the City 
offered to pay for the actual property physically appropriated 
and when plaintiffs were not willing to abandon their claim 
for compensation, the City carved out a new plan, taking a strip 
of property from each of the owners in order to build a sidewalk 
but excluding the property of the two plaintiffs so as to avoid 
a physical appropriation (Appellants1 Brief, pp. 18-19). By 
doing this the City recognized that if it physically appropriated 
a strip of plaintiffs1 property, the consequential damages to 
parking rights would follow. The result is a uniform street 
with sidewalks and curbs except for the property of the two 
plaintiffs, as shown on Exhibits D25, D30, D36, D39, D40, D41. 
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Paragraph 3 on page 3 touches the real issue which 
divides the parties. Judge Daniels felt compelled to determine 
whether there was a "taking" and found that there was no compensable 
damage if there was no physical taking and if a "reasonable 
access" to the property of plaintiffs survived. The actual 
facts were as stated in plaintiffs1 Brief (pp. 13 to 15) that 
plaintiffs obtained building permits giving them specific front 
parking spaces, which were marked, constructed their building 
in reliance on access to each of those parking spaces, and now 
the curb as placed has prevented access to any of those parking 
spaces in the established manner but does permit vehicles to 
reach that area, accommodating only one in front of the Three 
D building because there is no means of going forward and if 
a second car came in, the first one could not get out. This 
is true also of the Distributors building because with one car 
parked in the space, the second car would have to back out into 
the street, permitting at most two cars. If two cars parked 
abreast, they would have to block the area reserved for sidewalk 
use, which most people will not do, thus leaving as effective 
parking one space for the Three D building and one or at most 
two for the Distributors building (Appellants1 Brief, pp. 11-13). 
This is a taking of property rights and causes substantial damage 
to plaintiffs1 properties. 
Paragraph 4 on page 4 mentions "driving over a sidewalk", 
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which was not strictly true because there was no sidewalk until 
the City improved the area and placed sidewalks in front of 
all the properties except those of plaintiffs. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On page 4 respondent states that this is not a case 
in inverse condemnation. That seems not to make any difference, 
since the Second Cause of Action is based on demand and notice 
to the City and raises the same issues. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAD NO OWNERSHIP INTEREST 
IN THE PUBLIC PARKING SPACES 
At page 5 respondent cites Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 
51 Utah Adv.Rep. 6, P.2d (Utah 1987), and Standard 
Optical v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 535 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1975), 
neither of which has anything whatsoever to do with access to 
private property. Plaintiffs do not contend that there was 
any acquisition of easement by adverse use. The City issued 
building permits designating front parking spaces and the buildings 
were constructed in reliance on that. To refer to these as 
"long lost building plans" ignores both the facts and the signifi-
cance of the building permits. The issuance of the permits 
and the designation of parking spaces and the building in reliance 
are covered in plaintiffs1 Brief at pages 8 to 10. 
McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, U 26.215, says 
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in part: 
The general rule is that, although a building 
permit does not in itself confer or alter 
vested rights, investment, expenditures, 
or work under it may give rise to property 
rights entitled to protection of the law 
as such. 
And again in 11 30.63, McQuillin states: 
The most important right of the abutter 
incident to his ownership of property abutting 
on the street or alley is his right of access, 
i.e., his right of ingress and egress . . . It 
includes not merely the right of the abutting 
owner to go into and come out of his premises 
but also the right to have the premises 
accessible to patrons, clients, customers 
and visitors generally, with a degree of 
convenience and ease which in the circumstances 
are reasonable. Accordingly, the measure 
of the right of an abutter to access to 
a street is reasonable ingress and egress 
under all the circumstances. 
In most jurisdictions this right of access 
is held to be a proprietary right, an easement 
in the street attached to the estate or 
ownership of property abutting on a street 
or alley; . . . 
On page 6 respondent quotes two sentences from Utah 
State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 at 928, but stops 
short of the statements which have a bearing on this case, to 
wit: 
Thus, no private property right is taken 
by the construction of a median divider, 
since the abutting owner has no property 
right in the free flow of traffic past his 
place of business. However, where a police 
power is exercised as an incidental result 
of the exercise of eminent domain, just 
compensation is due if the market value 
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of the property has been diminished. The 
constitutional guarantee of just compensation 
for the taking or damaging of private property 
for public use is in no way affected by 
the fact that the expropriator is exercising 
the police power. The rights of access, 
light, and air are easements appurtenant 
to the land of an abutting owner on a street; 
they constitute property rights forming 
part of the owner's estate. These substantial 
property rights, although subject to reasonable 
regulation, may not be taken away or impaired 
without just compensation. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFFS' "DAMAGES" FOR THE CITY'S POLICE 
POWER ALTERATION OF ITS STREETS ARE 
"DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA" 
At page 10 of respondent's Brief it is stated and 
argued that: 
Damage claims for loss of access to parking 
have consistently been rejected across the 
country. 
It then cites five cases as supporting that general statement 
and as having some application to the facts of this case. 
The Brief states that Johnson v. Burke County, 101 
Ga.App. 747, 115 S.E.2d 484 (1960), is "under almost identical 
facts." The Court there upheld a general demurrer to the Complaint 
because the Complaint plus the attached diagrams show "no substantial 
interference with the means of ingress, egress or regress" and 
because the curb as it was constructed does "not interfere with 
the right of the plaintiffs, their customers or others, in the 
matter of ingress or egress." The implication is that if there 
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were such interference, damages would be recoverable even though 
there were no physical taking of the property. 
Respondent cites City of Phoenix v. Ward, 5 Ariz . App. 505, 
428 P.2d 450, 453 (1967). This case involved a private residence, 
to serve which the owner had built a garage and a carport which 
had direct access to the street and to the opposite side of 
the street. A curbing was placed in front of the property but 
did not close the entrance to the owner's carport and what was 
prohibited was left turns into the owner's property and the 
necessity that the owner would have to back on to the street 
rather than be able to drive forward on to the street. 
Respondent cites City of Orlando v. Cullom, 400 So. 2d 
513 (Fla. App. 1981) , where a 200-foot-long street, which was 
previously a one-way street, was closed and instead a mall with 
trees and decorations limited to pedestrian traffic was created. 
This eliminated parking on the street which previously existed 
but did not affect access to the property, since there had been 
no ingress or egress to or from that street. The court held 
that there was no special damage to this one owner, but it was 
an improvement affecting all of the owners on the street and 
they still had access to their property but no means of parking 
on a public thoroughfare, which is a matter subject to regulation 
by the city. This case has nothing to do with established access 
to the property of the owners. 
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Snyder v. State, 538 P.2d 920 (Idaho 1968), also was 
a case where parking on the street was eliminated as a means 
of controlling traffic and regulating traffic, which is within 
the police power. Again, this case has nothing to do with blocking 
established access to commercial property, in reliance upon 
which buildings have been constructed and retail business has 
been established. It deals only with parking on a public street. 
And finally, respondent cites Yegen v. City of Bismark, 
291 N.W.2d 422 (N.D. 1980). Here the plaintiff owned a grocery 
store which had been approached through having customers park 
on the public street in front of the store. The store had private 
parking for two customers and one delivery truck, which was 
not affected by the street improvement and the prohibition of 
parking on the street. The court cited Eck v. City of Bismark, 
283 N.W.2d 193, which case cited with approval an earlier case, 
King v. Stark County, 271 N.W. 771 (N.D. 1937). That case is 
interesting because it does involve interference with access 
to private property resulting from a street improvement and 
the court notes that whether the improvement interferes with 
access by constructing something or by creating an unusual elevation, 
it is still an interference which must be considered by the 
court to determine whether there is compensable damage and the 
extent of it. The Complaint alleged that the improvement and 
building of a new highway damaged the plaintiffs by preventing 
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them from going to their residence, to their barnyard and stock 
feeding establishment, by creating an unreasonably high grade 
with unreasonably deep ditches, by removing lateral support 
for the owner's right of way, and by preventing the owner from 
crossing the highway as he previously did to reach his property. 
The court reviewed the law in North Dakota and noted that at 
common law a physical taking was necessary before consequential 
damage could be recovered. But under the North Dakota Constitution, 
the State was required to pay compensation for "damaging" as 
well as for "taking" private property for public use and the 
court stated at page 774: 
Under it the courts have uniformly 
held that there is liability not 
only for property taken, but also 
for consequential damages to property 
arising from the acts of the authori-
ties in constructing public works. 
It is not necessary that there 
be a direct injury to the property 
itself in order to create this 
liability. It is sufficient to 
warrant a recovery if there be 
"some direct physical disturbance 
of a right, either public or private, 
which the plaintiff enjoys in 
connection with his property, 
and which gives to it an additional 
value, and that by reason of such 
disturbance he has sustained a 
special damage with respect to 
his property in excess of that 
sustained by the public generally." 
Rigney v. City of Chicago, supra; 
Mason City, etc., Railway Company 
v. Wolf, 148 F. 961, 78 C C A . 589. 
And the diminution in value of 
property resulting from the acts 
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complained of is special and peculiar 
within the meaning of the rule. 
See Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d 
Ed.) §§ 363 and 3 64, and the many 
authorities cited there. 
We urge this Court to review the law generally, the 
Utah cases, and the Utah Constitution, which requires compensation 
to owners of private property where their property is "taken 
or damaged" for the benefit of the public. Plaintiffs1 main 
Brief has attempted to analyze the Utah cases and point out 
that there are general statements which Judge Daniels has felt 
constrained to follow. We urge the Court to establish the dis-
tinction between physical taking of property and damaging of 
appurtenant rights such as access, as pointed out in State v. Miya, 
supra, but eliminate the requirement that there be a slight 
physical taking as a necessary support for determining the "damage". 
According to Nichols on Eminent Domain, the requirement 
of a physical appropriation is no longer required by most courts: 
f6.09 Non-physical Takings. Consideration 
has previously been given herein to the 
strict interpretation of the word "taking" 
in the constitutional clause dealing with 
eminent domain, by virtue of which a physical 
appropriation of the property involved is 
required. The weight of authority, however, 
is not in support of this strict construction. 
The modern, prevailing view is that any 
substantial interference with private property 
which destroys or lessens its value (or 
by which the owner's right to its use or 
enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged 
or destroyed) is, in fact and in law, a 
"taking" in the constitutional sense, to 
the extent of the damages suffered, even 
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though the title and possession of the owner 
remains undisturbed. 
This view was recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court 
in 1958 in Hughes v. State of Idaho, 328 P.2d 397, where the 
Court was applying a constitutional provision which required 
compensation for private property "taken" for public use and 
does not include the word "damage". In that case, the plaintiff 
owned a parcel of commercial property with two points of access, 
one from each of two streets, the property being a corner property. 
Street improvement raised the elevation and eliminated ingress 
and egress from one of the streets, for which the plaintiff 
sought damage by inverse condemnation, in seeking damage to 
their business, which resulted from this impairment of access. 
The court observed that many states include damage as well as 
taking in their constitutional provision and then approach the 
question whether the impairment of access is a "taking" of property 
and determine that the right of access a property right, citing 
and relying on 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, 111! 105 and 163, and 
then held: 
Our review of Idaho's Constitution, statutes 
and decisions, clearly shows that the power 
of eminent domain extends to every kind 
of property taken for public use, including 
the right of access to public streets, such 
being an estate or interest in and appurtenant 
to real property; and since such right of 
access constitutes an interest in, by virtue 
of being an easement appurtenant to, a larger 
parcel, the court, jury or referee must 
ascertain and assess the damages which will 
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accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned 
by reason of the severance of the portion—the 
right of access —sought to be condemned, 
and the construction of the improvement. 
I.C. sec. 7-711. 
We therefore hold that appellants1 allegedly 
destroyed right of business access to their 
business property, if such be proven, constituted 
a taking of their property, whether or not 
accompanied by a taking of physical property, 
and constituted an element of damage, as 
does also any element of alleged taking 
of their physical property, which must be 
ascertained and assessed in accordance with 
the legislative mandate of I.C. sec. 7-711. 
(p. 402) 
Also, in People v. Renaud, 198 Cal.App.2d 581, 17 
Cal.Rptr. 674, 676, 677, the California court had a case similar 
to our Miya case, supra, where a parcel of real property not 
having much value was physically taken but where the chief damage 
sought by the owner was damage from impairment of right of access 
to the commercial property. The court said: 
A long line of cases has held that a property 
owner abutting upon a public street or highway 
has a property right in the nature of an 
easement of ingress and egress to and from 
his property, and that right cannot be taken 
from him without just compensation . . . 
The damage for taking an easement appurtenant 
is measured by the injury to the land to 
which it is appurtenant. 
In that case the right of access was not totally destroyed, 
but the construction of the freeway gave only indirect access 
to the property which previously was accessed directly. 
Respondent states that the Keiffer v. King County 
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(1977), 89 Wash.2d 369, 572 P.2d 408, case relied on by the 
appellants is a minority of one in the face of several cases 
cited by respondent. As pointed out above, none of respondent's 
cases deals with the closing or impairing of established routes 
of access on to private property. We suggest that the only 
case clearly against the position of plaintiffs is the decision 
of Judge Daniels in this action. 
Furthermore, in Keiffer, supra, there had been no 
building permit issued which gave specific parking spaces and 
there was no showing that the buildings had been constructed 
in reliance on the building permit and the specific parking 
spaces, thus giving the plaintiffs six in one case and seven 
in the other case specific parking spaces with right of ingress 
and egress from the street. The closing of these access routes 
was a taking under the authorities we have cited and certainly 
was a damage to be measured by the reduction in the value of 
the premises with and without the front parking, as to which 
the testimony given is analzyed in plaintiffs1 main Brief at 
pages 13-15. 
The Brief of respondent completely ignores the fact 
that it is plain from the evidence that Salt Lake City intended 
the physical taking of a strip of private property all along 
13 00 South Street and then gerrymandered its plans because the 
plaintiffs had very substantial damage from loss of parking 
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spaces and asked for compensation. The City now attempts to 
destroy substantially those parking rights without a physical 
appropriation when it is apparent from the testimony and the 
photographs that ultimately there will be a modified curb and 
a sidewalk to be established in the future when the owners cannot 
claim that they own rights to parking spaces. 
SUMMARY 
The defendant planned a special improvement district 
to improve 13th South, making a four-lane street with curb, 
gutter and sidewalk, taking a narrow strip of property from 
the abutting owners for the gutter and sidewalk. But the plaintiffs 
had front parking for their buildings and the retail businesses 
which had been built up utilizing the front parking. 
The City defendant decided to avoid the damage claims 
for loss of parking by not taking any strip of land from these 
plaintiffs and thus prevent successful assertion of damage to 
their parking rights and access to their parking spaces. 
The District Court took the view that there had to 
be a taking by physical appropriation or unreasonable interference 
with access which amounted to a taking. The Court refused to 
make Findings of Fact based on the evidence supporting plaintiffs1 
theory of damage. 
Here there was blocking of all access routes used 
to reach the parking places as contained in the building plans 
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on which the building permits were issued and the buildings 
were constructed. These access routes had been in constant 
use for nearly thirty years. 
Plaintiffs have suffered substantial damage peculiar 
to their situations and their rights of access. The retail 
businesses have been virtually destroyed and the values of their 
properties have been greatly reduced. 
Regulation of traffic under the police power is not 
the issue. The City has blocked the established routes of access. 
The substituted access has so limited parking availability that 
the damages indicated are unavoidable. 
The property right of access over established routes 
has been taken. The rights of access have been so restricted 
that great damage has been caused these plaintiffs and no other 
property owners along 13th South Street. 
The District Court erred in misinterpreting the cases 
in Utah and elsewhere and in refusing to make Findings of Fact 
on the issues presented. The Conclusions of Law are in error 
on the evidence presented. The background of plaintiffs1 rights 
and the extent of damage suffered by them entitles them to compen-
sation under the Utah Constitution and the waiver of sovereign 
17 
immunity statutes. 
DATED this 1st day of June, 1987. 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
Richard L. Bird, Jr. ; / 
333 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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